Friday, December 13, 2013

“Strategic Depth”: Does It Promote Pakistan’s Strategic Interests?

http://www.academia.edu/978181/_Strategic_Depth_Does_It_Promote_Pakistans_Strategic_Interests

1,099

"In assessing Pakistan’s response to the ongoing ‘global
war on terrorism’ in Afghanistan, this paper presents two
sets of arguments; first, I argue that Pakistan’s strategic
interests constituting secure and peaceful borders along
with internal strength, development and prosperity, are
annulled rather than furthered by the Strategic Depth
policy framework, adopted and pursued for the last three
decades. Although this framework has allowed Pakistan
to maintain a semblance of regional military power balance
with India, yet it has led to a rise of extremism and
militancy within Pakistani society and to a loss of internal
sovereignty."

Research Interests:

Pakistan, Strategic Depth, Pakistan Army, Jihad, War on Terror, and 2 moreedit

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Number 11 - 13 | April 2011

: Raheem ul HaqueIn assessing Pakistan’s response to the ongoing ‘globalwar on terrorism’ in Afghanistan, this paper presents twosets of arguments; first, I argue that Pakistan’s strategicinterests constituting secure and peaceful borders alongwith internal strength, development and prosperity, areannulled rather than furthered by the Strategic Depthpolicy framework, adopted and pursued for the last threedecades. Although this framework has allowed Pakistanto maintain a semblance of regional military power bal-ance with India, yet it has led to a rise of extremism andmilitancy within Pakistani society and to a loss of internalsovereignty. Today, this flawed policy has created condi-tions that have made Pakistan a sanctuary for ideologi-cal non-state actors. Second, with an in-depth analysisand scrutiny of factors and actors in the three decadesof the Afghan war theatre, I submit that Strategic Depthis an outcome of the institutionalization of IdeologicalGuardianship mindset within Pakistan Army during the Ziayears, and its continuation has led to civil-military powerimbalance which needs to be altered to secure Pakistanfrom militancy and terrorism. Democratic consolidation,peace, prosperity and sustainable development in Pakistanhinges on abandoning the flawed, failed and nationallyinjurious policy of Strategic Depth.Overview: from Muslim to IslamicPakistan was born with undefined and problematicboundaries. On the Eastern front it inherited the Kashmirdispute with India and on the Western front the DurandLine

, which divided the Pashtuns between Afghanistanand Pakistan. Given the Pashtun ethnic factor, relationsbetween Pakistan and Afghanistan remained bitter butgenerally bearable. For example, at the time of indepen-dence Afghanistan was the only country that opposedPakistan’s entry into the UN, yet, over the year’s transittrade between the two counties has rarely been dis-continued. On the other hand, relations with India havelargely remained adversarial to hostile, punctuated byborder skirmishes to outright wars (1965 and 71, while1999 Kargil is recognized as a limited conflict). The 1971Indo-Pakistan war and the resultant break of Pakistan hadthree consequences for South Asia. First, India emerged asthe ‘dominant power’ of the region, second that intensi-fied Pakistan’s insecurity syndrome leading to an illusivesearch for Strategic Depth , third, although it shook thefoundations of “Two Nation Theory”, Pakistan still beganto drift towards Islamization through invoked fears of ‘Hindu India’. All this obliterated Jinnah’s vision of liberal,secular and democratic Pakistan. Although the processhad begun with the adoption of Objectives Resolution in1949, anti-Ahemdia riots in 1953, Pakistan’s joining of anti- Communist block, SEATO and CENTO pacts, how-ever, it accelerated through State sanction in post 1971Pakistan with the passage of bill (1974) declaring Ahmedisas ‘non-Muslim’, the religious parties led PNA movementagainst the PPP government in March-April 1977 andGeneral Zia- ul Haq’s military coup in July—who was quickto announce that Pakistan was an ‘Ideological State’

,thus Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan was deconstructed

.Institutionalization of Ideological Guardianship within theMilitary: 1978 - 1989General Zia-ul–Haq’s rise in Pakistan coincided with theIslamic Revolution in Iran, and the Socialist Revolution inAfghanistan supported by Russian forces. He had beenquick in revealing his ‘Islamist and fundamentalist’ streakwhen he changed the army‘s motto from Jinnah’s ‘Unity,Faith, Discipline’ to ‘Iman, Taqwa, Jihad fi sabeelillah’(Faith, Obedience of God, Struggle in the path of Allah)as army chief.

Following the coup, he went full pacein Nifaz-e-Islam (the implementation of Islam) makingthe army not just the guardian of territorial but also theideological frontiers of Pakistan.

Zia aligned himself withthe Islamist Jamaat-Islami, inducted its cadres in stateinstitutions, while manipulated his core constituency, theArmy through promotion and incentivization of religiosity,even allowing Tableeghi Jamaat to preach in the militaryacademy. More importantly, the Inter Services Intelligence(ISI) which had developed links with Jamaat-e-Islami dur-ing the era of General Yahya Khan(1969-71) to countermainstream PPP, NAP and National Awami League

,became directly responsible for operational, logistical andpsychological warfare during the US and Saudi-Arabiasponsored Afghan Jihad. This network was instrumental inchurning out 80,000 warriors between 1982 and 1987

.By most accounts ISI emerged as the sole conduit of fundsto Afghan Mujahideen and encapsulating both Operations

“Strategic Depth”: Does It Promote Pakistan’s Strategic Interests?

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and Intelligence functions, it became independently pow-erful and resourceful growing in strength from 2000 em-ployees in 1978 to 40,000 with a $1bn budget in 1988

.The distribution of funds and linkages to Afghan groupsbased solely on being more Islamist and pro-Pakistan

helped it take on an ideological character. Thus as SaudiArabia matched America’s funding for the Afghan war, inreality Zia’s Islamization drive would be better categorizedas ‘Wahabization’ of Pakistani State and society

. Ad-ditionally, during this decade use of ideology emerged as apotent factor in regional and global politics.The 1980s also saw the rise of an ideological US presidentRonald Reagan, thus providing an ideological affinity forthe Pak-US leadership. This affinity was to play a crucialrole in subsequent years on the formation and emergenceof Taliban and the internationalist Al-Qaeda. While thesituation fit the strategic interests of both America tocounter the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia to counterIran—giving it overt sectarian overtones. On the otherhand, Pakistan played the role of a client state accept-ing America’s strategic interest of defeating the SovietUnion rather than securing its Western border; simultane-ously, accepting thousands of Islamic radicals from othercountries and putting up hundreds of ‘militant trainingcells’ to generate the radicalized manpower needed forthis task. There was little realization about the culturalconsequences to a plural and a relatively peaceful society.Rather than finding a political solution to the Afghan im-broglio to end war and its consequences as suggested bythe Russians as early as 1983

, Pakistan pressed on withAmerica’s strategic interests to defeat the Russians in Af-ghanistan only to sign on the Geneva Accords in 1988. Af-ter fulfilling its strategic interests in Afghanistan, Americaleft the region leaving behind a war torn country, millionsof refugees and thousands of trained Islamist militantswhile additionally splashing sanctions on Pakistan soonafter for its nuclear program. This period thus involved anovert State sponsorship of Islamist ideology, full throttleinternational support for ideological non-state militants(the Mujahideen) and institutionalization of IdeologicalGuardianship within the army.Manifestations of Ideological Guardianship in StrategicDepth: 1989 - 2001The third phase of Pakistan’s history began with a transi-tion to democracy rather than a fundamentalist ideologueat the helm, however, the ideological tilt of the militarylingered on; first, the army ventured to undercut theliberal PPP in elections through the formation of an alli-ance of rightist parties—Islami Jamhuri Ittehad (IJI), thenit dictated terms for government formation

and eventu-ally it brought an aligned political party to power. Zia’sideological focus continued with the new army chief Gen.Mirza Aslam Baig, who disregarded Pakistan’s territorialinterests by wanting to sell nuclear know how to Iran, butthe deal was rejected even by the ideologically aligned ci-vilian leader

. The Soviet failure and eventual withdrawalprovided further impetus to the framework of Jihad- thenexus of Islamist ideology and the use of non-state actors.Thus as the Kashmiri rose in open revolt against Indianpolicies and a rigged election, rather than strengtheningthe nationalist movement to build internal and interna-tional impetus to resolve the tripartite issue, Pakistaninstead wrested the struggle away in favor of an ideologi-cal framework

negating the territorial aspect of unde-fined boundary and nationalist aspirations at the heart of the issue. The surplus manpower and infrastructure of theAfghan war was redirected to the Kashmiri struggle withthe confidence that if a superpower could be defeatedso could India.

The ideological aspect was pushed to itslogical conclusion by Zia’s civilian protégé, Nawaz Sharif with the appointment of an Islamist ideologue (GeneralJaved Nasir, who had connections with Tableeghi Jamaat)to head the ISI thus extending Jihad operations beyond

...encapsulating both Operationsand Intelligence functions, ISIbecame independently power-ful and resourceful growing instrength from 2000 employeesin 1978 to 40,000 with a $1bnbudget in 1988.

”“

...the Strategic Depth policybecame the practical mani-festation of strategic interestsunderstood through the prismof Ideological Guardianship of Pakistan military.

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Number 11 - 13 | April 2011

Afghanistan and Kashmir. It was only after the fall of civilian government that the existing military dispensationremoved the ISI chief and sent personnel back to theirregular army units, but only when Pakistan was threat-ened with being declared a terrorist state

.The concept of Strategic Depth evolved and was promotedunder these broad considerations. With the US departure;Afghanistan still in shatters, the Western front graduallybecame an extension of Pakistan’s battle with India. Theinstitutionalization of Ideological Guardianship was basedon the fear of India invoked in religious terms; the non-state actors were galvanized as ideological weapons andthe second line of defense against India. This provided arationale for the option of strategic space in Afghanistanto safeguard military assets against India. Its practicalmanifestation was the pursuit of an illusionary and flawedpolicy of Strategic Depth . With Jihad now transformedinto a civil war among former Mujahideen leaders, Paki-stan shifted its support

to an alternative Pushtun move-ment of Taliban (Deobandi Madrassa students) to bringpeace in Afghanistan. While the march through Pushtunareas into Kabul was easy, the diversity of Afghanistaneither afforded peace of the dead or a multi-ethnic andmulti-sectarian broadening of the Taliban, an impossibil-ity within the Taliban’s ideological framework. As Pakistanbecame one of only three countries (in addition to UAEand Saudi-Arabia) to recognize the Taliban government,Afghanistan instead became a regional battleground. Still,even a dependent Afghan government refused to acceptthe territorial integrity of its neighbor

and there wasno change in the Afghan position on Durand Line. Rashidargues otherwise stating that Durand Line was never apriority for Pakistan because a fixed border would amountStrategic Depth as blatant interference in another State.He further states that even though the UN was inclined toresolve the Durand Line issue during Geneva talks in 1988,Pakistan never raised the issue then or during the decadethat Pakistan proxies ruled Afghanistan

. Thus the Stra-tegic Depth policy became the practical manifestation of strategic interests understood through the prism of Ideo-logical Guardianship of Pakistan military. This policy hadfour components; first, an undefined boundary—retainingthe contested Durand Line, second, ensuring a friendlyregime in Afghanistan, third, curbing Pashtun separatismand nationalism through Islamism, fourth, ensuring a safesanctuary for training ideological non-state actors forPakistan’s regional policy objectives.Although Pakistan’s connections with few international-ist Jihadi groups continued because of their convergenceof interest in supporting the Taliban against the NorthernAlliance, they were not a part and parcel of the Strate-gic Depth framework as conflicting reports appeared inregards to Pakistan’s policy towards Al-Qaeda. On the onehand, Osama Bin Ladin’s training camp ‘The Lions Den’ inAfghanistan reportedly also trained ISI linked local Jihad-ist groups, on the other, Pakistan also repatriated foreignJihadists to their countries in 1993.

Yet, another reportindicates that just before the 1999 military coup thePrime Minister of Pakistan had agreed in principle to sup-port the American effort to nab Osama Bin Ladin.

The internal cost of Ideological Guardianship combinedwith privatization and outsourcing of military functions(Jihad) started to be felt in the 1990s

. The prolifera-tion and militarization of Deobandi-Wahabi mosque-madrassa network grew in parallel to Khomeini inspiredShia mobilization deepening the sectarian divide withinPakistan. This had an impact on the more peaceful andSufi tradition inspired Barelvis, who also resorted to mili-tarization to protect their interests

. As Saudi-Iran fundedproxies battled it out, the use of ideology by the Statedisallowed any comprehensive counter terrorism strategywhile trained militants changed garbs and seamlesslymoved between overtly sectarian and Jihadi organizations,some hunted while others supported and funded by theparadoxical security environment. The sectarian dividehad become pronounced much earlier as even GeneralZia ul Haq had to concede that some Ulema were usingthe Anti-Ahmedia Ordinance to fan sectarianism

. Thusit was not a surprise when a decade later an ideologicalally, the Taliban refused to hand over sectarian terrorists

...the use of ideology by theState disallowed any com-prehensive counter terrorismstrategy while trained militantschanged garbs and seamlesslymoved between overtly sectar-ian and Jihadi organizations,

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enjoying sanctuary in Afghanistan while the same person(Riaz Basra of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) had earlier ‘disappeared’from the courts in Pakistan

. The level of accountabilityfor ideologically aligned non-state actors can be judgedfrom the fact that a Jihadi commander (Qari SaifullahAkhtar) implicated in an internal military coup in collusionwith military officers was let go while the officers wereincarcerated.

In total 997 were killed and 2,523 wereinjured in sectarian violence from 1989-2000.

Further-more, Pakistan’s sectarian Jihadist connections had raisedtensions with neighbor Iran as the killing of the IranianCounselor General in Lahore

and the killing of IranianConsulate Staff in Mazar-e-Sharif were blamed on groupslinked to Pakistan’s intelligence agency.Thus during this period, the Strategic Depth frameworkbased on the internalization of Ideological Guardianshipwithin the military and the institutionalization of non-state actors as a tool for furthering it gained momentum.Resultantly, there emerged a Jihad Industry with numer-ous militant organizations, some proxies of the Pakistanistate and others driven by their own independent agenda.These organizations competed for battlefield success, pub-licized their ideology and adventures through more thana hundred publications

while generating funds throughState patronage, and international and domestic privatecontributors

.Territorial versus Ideological Guardianship: The Aftermathof 9/11The dawn of Sept 12, 2001, while changing the strategicinterests of the West did not alter the existing regionalgame play where the Pakistan-Saudi alliance backing theTaliban was pitched against the Iran-India-Russia alliancesupporting the Northern Alliance throughout the 1990s.Additionally, Afghanistan had become a sanctuary of global Jihadi groups-- including Pakistani, Arab, Uzbek,Chechen, Uighur Chinese and others, each pursuing itsown agendas.Faced with territorial threat from the sole superpower, thehead of ISI agreed to all American demands in Washing-ton. But he was one of the four generals to argue againstpulling out support for the Taliban in favor of America inthe Corps Commander meeting

. While tactically Pakistanhad changed its position to safeguard the home terri-tory, still the military deeply imbued in Strategic Depthideology over the last two decades needed time to rethinkits future options in the region now that America hadbecome an active player. Additionally the Jihad infra-structure created over these years needed just the rightcompromise to avoid a blowback. This explained GeneralMusharraf’s defensive speech to the nation supporting theAmerican “War on Terror”, literally abandoning the Tali-ban, but sheepishly shielding Pakistan’s Nuclear Weaponsand the Kashmir Policy, while ensuring that Pakistan wasnot declared a state sponsoring terrorism or was encircledby India. Pakistan accepted most American demands,breaking diplomatic ties and logistical support for theTaliban, providing bases, over flight and landing rights,and sharing of intelligence on key Taliban and Al-Qaedaleaders among others

. But while getting billions in mili-tary and economic aid

, Pakistan’s strategic interests of afriendly Afghan government through inclusion of moder-ate Taliban

(who disown Al-Qaeda) or Hizb-e-Islami

did not find any ears and instead a Northern Alliancedominated government was formed in Kabul.General Musharraf was quick to conduct a militaryshakeup rooting out Generals who had disagreed withhis policy shift and disbanding two main units of the ISIwith links to Islamist militants

. Against intense Americanpressure, Pakistan moved 80,000 soldiers to the Afghanborder to stem and capture Al-Qaeda operatives enteringinto Pakistan. According to Rashid, Pakistani military wascareful not to place security forces at the border adjoiningWarizistan or Baluchistan, implying it allowed Al-Qaedaoperatives’ access to Waziristan

. While Pak-US intel-ligence worked closely to capture Al-Qaeda, Pakistani orAfghan Taliban who had been furthering Pakistan’s policyobjectives in the region were not touched and simplywent home or to the mosque-madrassa establishmentsthat facilitated them. Furthermore some 500-1000 menfighting the Americans to a standstill were airlifted fromKunduz as a personal favor to Musharraf in late Novem-ber

. A complete strategic re-alignment had yet to comeas the military safeguarded its assets either because itsstrategic interests still required them or because it consid-ered the risk to take on the complete ideological networkit had molded for twenty years as too high. Pre-emptingPakistan’s policy agenda, the ideological groups conducteda master stroke on December 13, 2001 (Tora Bora fell on

Number 11 - 13 | April 2011

December 16) with an attack on the Indian parliamentforcing Pakistan to stop troop deployment to the Afghanborder

and for Pakistan to reflect on who its ally and foewere as Pakistan army came face to face with the larg-est Indian troop mobilization since 1971

as more than1,000 Al-Qaeda operatives slipped through the border

.The Afghan chess board which was dominated by thePakistan-Saudi-Taliban alliance throughout the 1990s wasshuffled overnight following the US and NATO engage-ment. America initially needed and then supported theIran-India proxy-- the Northern Alliance to dominate theKabul government. Iran looked the other way as its archfoe America dismantled Taliban in Afghanistan. Indiabegan making strategic investments worth more than$1.2bn

, constructing road infrastructure (connectingIranian port Charbahar to Central Asia thus bypassingGawadar), telecom facilities which used Indian satellitesand re-opening four consulates especially Qandahar andJalalabad close to the Pakistan border

. Pakistan whilelogistically supporting the American “War on Terror” andcapturing Al-Qaeda was unsure of its future course of action. With the history of American cut and run in 1989,its own strategic interests unchanged, its rivals gainingground and most importantly a society socialized to theIslamist discourse through twenty years of Jihad propaga-tion and Taliban eulogizing by Army establishment in ca-hoots with right wing forces, Pakistan dithered to make aclean break with the Taliban as it would have demanded acomplete reorientation of its ideological strategic outlook.Policy Ambivalence and the Making of FATA Insurgency:2002 - 2006With the changed post 9/11 scenario, Pakistan could notkeep its Kashmir policy of using non-state actors intactfor too long especially after Kashmiri Jihadi groups wereimplicated in the attack on Indian Parliament in Decem-ber 2001. The attack forced Pakistan to ban Kashmiroriented Jihadi groups

, however, these groups movedtheir training camps to Azad Kashmir or FATA continu-ing training till at least March 2004

. The 3000 arrestedmembers of banned organizations were freed after amonth

but continued American pressure forced demobi-lization of Kashmiri militants in 2003-04

and closing of the intelligence’s Kashmir Cell by 2004 without extensivede-weaponization or rehabilitation. The great majority of Kashmir centric Jihadi organizations drew their manpowerfrom Punjab. Most of these groups had trained in Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan where their leaders rubbedshoulders with Al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. While theideologically imbued secular institution of Pakistan Armytook its time deciding between its ideological inclinationand territorial necessity, the Punjabi Taliban no doubtwere clear about the ideological basis of their cause. Fewrestrained (Lashkar-e-Taiba) under the ISI umbrella, oth-ers split (Jaish-e-Mohammad - JeM) or moved wholesale(Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) into the Al-Qaeda camp. Christianand American installations were the initial target of thesegroups across Pakistan in 2002 till they regrouped in Wa-ziristan. It was only after General Pervez Musharraf cameunder attack in December 2003, that Pakistan militarybegan to review its policy of maintaining connectionswith Jihadi groups. This attack clearly indicated a nexusbetween the Punjabi Taliban and Al-Qaeda while show-ing their penetration in the armed forces as more thanfifty Air Force personnel linked to JeM were charged.

Various senior Kashmir Jihad leaders were picked up andinterrogated further increasing the gulf between the oncepartners. This led highly trained guerrillas along with mas-ter strategists such as Ilyas Kashmiri of the 313 Brigade to join the Afghan war theatre in 2005

. Although Kashmiriargued that he would not go against Pakistan’s interests,still the strategic guidance to Punjabi/Kashmiri groupsbased in Waziristan was now being provided by Al-Qaedarather than the ISI.On the political front, the Islamist and religious partieswho came together under the banner of ‘Defense of Af-ghanistan Council’

and later took the shape of Muttahi-da Majlis-e-Amal (a conglomeration of Deobandi, Wahabi,Shia and Barelvi parties but effective power lay with thelarger JUI & JI) came to power in Khyber Pukhtoonkha(NWFP) and Baluchistan. Several factors contributed to

...attack on Musharraf clearlyindicated a nexus between thePunjabi Taliban and Al-Qaedawhile showing their penetrationin the armed forces as morethan fifty Air Force personnellinked to JeM were charged.

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the emergence of MMA—its open anti-American stance,exclusion of PPP and PML- N leadership from electoralprocess (while Azam Tariq, the head of Sipah-e-Sahabawas allowed to contest from his jail cell), the require-ment of a Bachelors degree while accepting madrassadegrees. All these factors demonstrated that the militarygovernment was falling back on its ideological proxies tocobble together a pliant government that fit its strate-gic interests.

Thus as JUI virtually gave Pashtunabad,Quetta to the Afghan Taliban, heads of JUI madrassasalong the Quetta-Chaman area met in Quetta with seniorISI officers for funds and student rotation every month

and Musharraf made Ijaz-ul-Haq, son of the fundamen-talist military dictator the Minister for Religious Affairs,the MMA reciprocated by supporting the constitutionalamendment to make Musharraf a powerful president.With ideological godfathers of the Taliban in power, thosewho had fought America alongside the Taliban as min-isters, and a cadre that considered sheltering Al-Qaedaleaders a responsibility, the Afghan Taliban and othermilitant groups were given a free hand in organizing, mo-bilizing and propagating their message at the local levelwithout any threat from the provincially controlled police.For the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, it was a time to regroup.While Al-Qaeda regenerated in its new high HinduKushsafe haven, the Afghan Taliban prepared their manpoweras expansion of madrassas gained pace along the QuettaChaman Highway. Pakistan had no counter-terrorismstrategy other than intelligence and operational facilita-tion to the Americans in hunting Al-Qaeda members,while not a single top Taliban was given to the Ameri-cans

who themselves were also least interested, insteadshifting their strategic focus to Iraq. Still the ISI (collusionwith CIA is suggested) did create proxies early on eitherto keep the Jihad flame burning or to split the Talibanthrough the notion of ‘moderate’ Taliban - the JamiatulKhudamul Koran or later Jaish Muslimin condemned Mul-lah Omar’s support for Al-Qaeda while fighting foreignforces in Afghanistan

. Initially the Afghan governmentbecame concerned about Taliban regrouping in Pakistan inmid 2003 and later as American casualties in Afghanistandoubled in 1st six months of 2004 compared to the previ-ous year, American pressure vis-à-vis Taliban changed intothreats. Americans had been pressuring for action in Wa-ziristan since mid 2002 owing to cross border attacks andhostage taking. Pakistan had initially tried the tribal elderroute to dissuade locals to shelter foreigners or to conductcross border attacks but to no effect. It then followed itup with small scale operations which did not resolve theproblem either. But following the assassination attempton Musharraf traced to Warizistan and American pressureto tackle Al-Qaeda militants in South Waziristan, Pakistaneventually went for a larger scale operation

leading tohigh military casualties at Kaloosha (See Figure 1). Twoleading Pakistani journalist present varied interpretationof the operation; Gul calls it a spontaneous reaction andmobilization of people to defend a comrade leader and awakeup call for the military in relation to militants. Rashidgoes a step further terming it an intelligence failureblaming the ISI, which understood the ground realities inSouth Waziristan. This would lead to first of many peaceagreements with FATA militants done from a position of weakness. The peculiarity of the Shakai Agreement wasthat it was done in ‘Jamia Arabia Ahsanul Madaris’, amadrassa rather than the usual public jirga thus subscrib-ing legitimacy to the mullah-militant nexus in the eyes of the local people.

The terms of agreement required tribal militants not toattack the Pakistan Armed Forces, conduct cross bor-der attacks or to establish parallel administration whilecommitting to register foreign militants. In turn the Armywould dismantle check posts in the area, free incarcer-ated tribal militants and compensate the tribe for damagedone during the operation. While the agreements stoppedattacks on Pakistan military, attacks on NATO forces inAfghanistan spiked invoking a conflict of interest betweenthe two partners in the ‘War on Terror’. This tactical con-flict of interest could have been resolved if Pakistan andAmerica had the same strategic vision but low trust factor

...Pakistan managed to sparkits own insurgency in FATAthrough haphazard militaryoperations being ill-trainedfor a highly mobile war, tak-ing responsibility for Americanattacks in FATA , and allowingmilitants to consolidate theircontrol.

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Number 11 - 13 | April 2011

and demonizing of the ISI and America in the Western andPakistani press respectively precluded a real partnershipfor a troubled relationship instead. Thus a cycle ensuedwhere America would either sabotage the peace agree-ment through a drone strike

making new martyrs orPakistan would conduct a haphazard operation coincidingwith a meeting of an American dignitary inflaming a newtribe, followed by a new peace agreement

.Additionally, the military’s air raids, scorched earth andcollective punishment practices affecting civilians in try-ing to kill or capture key militant commanders followedby peace agreements led to enmity with the tribe

whileraising commander’s profile in the tribe as often compen-sation was distributed through his offices. It also gavethe militant commander financial strength, while pullingthe army back from the areas made it easy for militantsto target pro government tribal leaders who had initiallyinvited or acquiesced government’s operation. In total 400tribal Maliks in FATA

were killed leaving the militants torun a parallel government where they were the only ne-gotiating partner and decision makers for the tribe whilehundreds of thousands of civilians were displaced. Thus inWaziristan where the Pakistan Army had initially targetedAhmadzai Wazir militants for harboring foreign elementsin 2003, by 2006 the three tribes of Waziristan, theMehsuds, Wazirs and the Dawars were fighting togetheragainst a common enemy for the first time in history

.Thus while the Pakistani state showed policy ambivalencesimilar to the 1990s at a cursory level; in reality it wasstill focused on its ideological Strategic Depth policy, thedifference being that two independent players, Americaand Al-Qaeda had now joined the fray. Pakistan targetedAl-Qaeda only to keep America happy while opting forpeace accords with tribal militants to concentrate theiractivities inside Afghanistan and not attack Pakistaniforces. America had yet to differentiate between Al-Qaedaand Afghan Taliban and wanted Pakistan to target bothFigure 1: Taliban Insurgency & Military Operations in Pakistan

Source: Interactive Map; Leaders of Pakistan’s Militant Groups.Center for American Progress

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groups rather than sign peace accords. Al-Qaeda wantedto stay an important player in the Afghan theatre as thisensured its survival in the Waziristan safe haven primar-ily because it could be sacrificed for Pakistan’s strategicinterests and was the primary reason for American pres-ence in Afghanistan. Pakistan military had misjudged thatJihadis, especially the lower cadre would also understandcompulsions of state craft where Al-Qaeda was targetedwhile Afghan Taliban facilitated. Thus even though Paki-stan’s strategic interests gained ground as Taliban insur-gency flourished in Afghanistan by the summer of 2006, ithad instead managed to spark its own insurgency in FATAthrough haphazard military operations being ill-trainedfor a highly mobile war, taking responsibility for Americanattacks in FATA

, and allowing militants to consolidatetheir control. The government had tried but failed tooutbid Al-Qaeda, which was handsomely paying its tribalhosts for housing and security, and provided ideologicalguidance while military’s actions alienated tribes and onlyenhanced militant hold in other agencies. Additionallythe State negligently allowed shifting of militants fromKashmir to the Afghan front; not realizing that they couldmove under the umbrella of Al-Qaeda enhancing both Al-Qaeda’s skill set and strike capability within Pakistan.War Hits Home: The Loss of Internal Sovereignty2007 - 2008The spillover effects of policy ambivalence appeared asthe militants’ targets increasingly moved beyond the tribalareas focusing on the State’s security apparatus. Mul-lah Dadullah, the Afghan Taliban Commander in Chief had earlier brokered a ceasefire between militants andPakistan Army arguing that militants should concentratetheir efforts on fighting NATO forces in Afghanistan; whileforeign militants and Al-Qaeda linked groups such as Tahir Yuldashev, the head of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistandisagreed.

Although there was a short reprieve when Uz-bek militants were expelled from Wazir section of SouthWaziristan due to infighting and with Army’s support of the Taliban commander Mullah Nazir, they found sanctu-ary with the Mehsuds. Thus indicating both turf wars andenmeshed linkages between groups in the tribal areas of Pakistan.The situation had aggravated earlier when governmentauthorities brushed aside the killing of 82 including12 teenagers at a Tehreek-e-Nifaz Sharia Muhammadi(TNSM) seminary in October 2006 in Damadola, Bajaur inan air strike calling them militants, thus provoking TSNMmovement in Swat to openly call for arms

. But it was themilitary’s quashing of militants in the Lal Masjid operationin July 2007 in full media publicity and national publicuproar, when militants finally gave up the possibility of rapprochement with the military further moving into theAl-Qaeda camp, leading them to formulate a commonstrategy across FATA. Other than a spate of suicide bomb-ings across the country, the affect of Lal Masjid could be judged from the ‘abduction’ of 200-250 security personnelin August 2007 including nine army officers who offeredlittle resistance

.Pakistan lost its key link with the Qandahari group

, andleverage over FATA militants with the killing of Dadullahin March 2007. His death was defining moment as it ledto a shift in the Afghan Taliban leadership, which increas-ingly came under the control of Haqqani Network, a closerassociate of Al-Qaeda. By this time, militants had carvedout a territory for their command and control centers,more than 100 illegal FM Stations operated in FATA &NWFP, half of them in settled areas working as theirpropaganda arms

while Al-Qaeda’s media arm Al-Sahabtripled its Audio Visual production to 58 in 2006 and 89in 2007

for militants’ strategic guidance in both Pakistanand Afghanistan. The year culminated with formation of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) with an estimated strengthof about 40,000 militants

.As an all out war began in 2008, TTP gained an upperhand with militants seizing to try to blow up the KohatTunnel cutting off Peshawar’s access from the Indus High-

With momentum shifting tothe militants, the insurgencyincreasingly over taken by Al-Qaeda linked groups and underincreased pressure from theinternational community to domore, Pakistan allowed Americato setup a secret CIA base fordrone attacks inside FATA inJanuary 2008.

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Number 11 - 13 | April 2011

way unsuccessfully. It overran the Sararogha Fort, SouthWaziristan in January 2008 and increased suicide bomb-ings in urban areas leading the government to launchmilitary operations in a number of tribal agencies followedby peace agreements. While it seemed that the PakistaniState had finally woken up to the militant terrorist threat,the valley of Swat away from FATA proved otherwise as asmall time mullah practically took over the territory withthe help of TTP militants (foreigners included) who hadshifted from FATA to get away from military operationsand more importantly the drone attacks. Though he hadbeen facilitated by the MMA government and intelligenceagencies

, the 2007 military operation neither closeddown his propaganda radio, nor targeted his headquarters(Imam Deri) or arms dump, thus allowing the emerg-ing Taliban to increase their control of Swat from 15%to 70%, eventually leading a Malik (tribal leader) AfzalKhan Lala to ask if Taliban and the Military were actuallypartners?.

The Americans unable to contain the Afghan insurgencyshifted the blame to Pakistan and its inability to closedown militant sanctuaries in FATA. It’s reassessment of the war shifted the focus on Pakistan to do more in the“War on Terror”. America thus supported a negotiatedsettlement between Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto, thehead of a liberal party who could rally public supportand provide the much needed civil political backing for acomplete break with Pakistan’s ideological strategy, whichwas required to tackle the Afghan Taliban problem alongwith Al-Qaeda. But Benazir Bhutto, a strategic threat toIslamist, Jihadi and the Islamist segment of military es-tablishment became the biggest Pakistani casualty of war.With momentum shifting to the militants, the insurgencyincreasingly over taken by Al-Qaeda linked groups andunder increased pressure from the international com-munity to do more, Pakistan allowed America to setup asecret CIA base for drone attacks inside FATA in January2008

. The drone attacks would strictly be an Americanaffair, disowned and publicly berated by the Governmentof Pakistan allowing it to keep its peace agreements intactwith FATA militants.The year 2007 was a year of political turmoil in Pakistanas pro-democracy movement gained speed along side theTTP insurgency in FATA, specifically denting the army’smorale as it was being criticized by all segments of thepolitical spectrum – the liberal segments berating it forCiviliansSecurityForcePersonnelTerrorists/InsurgentsTotalDroneAttacksSuicideAttacksBombAttacks200223520031402425189 2412004435184244863 71372005430811376481424520064303255381,4710729920071,5225971,4793,59815667820082,1556543,9066,715195948520092,3249918,38911,704467849920101,7964695,1707,4359067193Total9,4103,32519,88832,623157282*2,612*Table1: Fatalities in Terrorist Violence & Number of Attacks

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal, Institute of Conflict Management.http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/index.html*Figures calculated in From Social Impact of the Security Crises, Social Development in Pakistan Annual Review 2009-10, Karachi: SPDC 2010

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being in alliance with the Mullah-Jihadi nexus, question-ing its will to take on the surging militants while theIslamists condemned it for bringing the American war toPakistan. The political dynamics changed as the new ArmyChief took over followed by the formation of governmentby an alliance of secular liberal parties in the Centre andKhyber Pakhtoonkha in March 2008. Policy formula-tion now included the civilian leadership which wantedgood relations with the Afghan and Indian governments

along with a more independent role for America to tacklethreats emanating from Pakistan but had to convince thepowerful ideological guardians, the military and intelli-gence establishments. The overtures of the weak coalitioncivilian government in regional policy matters were soonrebuffed and its international credibility ruined with theattack on the Indian embassy

and Hamid Karzai in Kabul.The nail in the coffin was the December 2008 terroristattack in Mumbai implicating Lashkar-e-Taiba, the mostdisciplined and the only non-state actor which had notsplit staying within the ISI umbrella after the demobiliza-tion of Kashmir Jihad.

Regaining Governance: Are We Approaching the EndGame 2009 – 2010?As Taliban control in Afghanistan increased from 30/364districts in 2003 to 164/364 districts by end of 2008 ow-ing partly to suicide attacks 21 (2005), 136 (2006) and137 (2007)

, it was clear that the American policy of out-right military victory over the Taliban had failed. Americashifted blame equally to corruption in the Afghan govern-ment and the double game of the Pakistan ISI arguingthat 80% of the suicide attacks in Afghanistan could betraced back to Warizistan

as CIA shared evidence of ISIlinks with the Haqqani Network

which was behind Af-ghan suicide attacks. The Afghan voices had started argu-ing in late 2007 that there could be no peaceful solutionto Afghanistan without Hekmatyar & Taliban

, later takenup by the British Defense Secretary

. Obama laid out hisAfghan Policy (Af-Pak) in March 2009 accepting both areconciliation strategy in principle as well as the impor-tance of Pakistan’s role in American exit strategy. Butrather than initiating a political dialog with the AfghanTaliban, the American strategy involved a military buildupto break the Taliban momentum while using the eigh-teen month period till July 2011 to articulate a politicalstrategy followed by draw down of troops. The reconcilia-tion strategy was eventually endorsed by the internationalcommunity in the January 2010 London Conference witheven India and Russia giving up their opposition to talkswith the Taliban

. Terroristattacks

Operationalattacks

Clashesmilitants

BorderclashesPoliticalviolence

Inter-tribalclashesDroneattacksNumber of attacks20082,148 9555881913220092,586596209781302175120102,11326036969233214135Number of persons killed20082,2673,1826553951621,33621620093,0216,3291,1637002101,20966720102,9132,6312,00765660766961Table2: Incidence of Terrorist Attacks/Clashes in Pakistan

1. Including insurgent and sectarian incidents.2. Operations conducted by security forces against militants.3. Ethno-political and sectarian.4. Clashes between security forces and militants.Source: Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS), Pakistan Security Reports 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010.Referenced in From Social Impact of the Security Crises, Social Development in Pakistan Annual Review 2009-10, Karachi: SPDC 2010

Number 11 - 13 | April 2011

The peak years of war (2008 & 2009) in Pakistan wereyears of realignment as well as a movement away fromclandestine to a relatively more open articulation of itsinterests. Pakistan had bore the brunt of the “War on Ter-ror” losing 1,211 soldiers by Dec 2007

along with exces-sive collateral damage as suicide bombings jumped from7 (2006), 54 (2007) to 59 (2008)

. While the Pakistanmilitary had formally launched military operations in FATAon July 19, 2007

, it still seemed to lack the resolve totackle the insurgency holistically either because this wentagainst its strategic goals in Afghanistan, it was scared of defections within army ranks due to soldiers subscriptionof Al-Qaeda ideology, or because it needed public supportlost during years of military dictatorship. Gul argues thatGHQ finally woke up to the internal threat when the warcame home in late 2008. But more importantly, pressur-ized from all fronts: by the international community fol-lowing Bombay massacre; by civil society in Pakistan afterSwat fell to the militants; by the civil government aftermilitants broke the Swat peace agreement; and by theAmericans invoking security of Pakistan’s nuclear weaponsand the capital Islamabad, the military conducted a suc-cessful large scale operation in Swat with political back-ing. However, almost all top militant leaders escaped. Thiswas followed by another successful operation against thecommand and control centre of TTP in South Waziristanin the summer of 2009 while keeping peace agreementsintact with two main Taliban commanders of South &North Warizistan . This arrested the Pakistani Talibanmomentum in FATA and adjoined areas thus pushing theminto North Waziristan

, which was outside the writ of theState. Pakistan’s new initiative increased the cost of warwith 76 suicide bombings in 2009

(Also see Table 1 & 2)and then finally the seat of power, the Army General HeadQuarters (GHQ) was attacked in October 2009 while ad-ditionally army families were targeted in a mosque attack.It seemed that the army had finally taken note with aserving general stating that the army had reached a con-sensus in principle to go after all groups indiscriminately,irrespective of their earlier links to military institutions

.By now, America had recognized the need to engage Paki-stan in a strategic dialogue to influence its policy ratherthan solely using it as a client state to try to achieveAmerican goals in Afghanistan. Although Pakistan stillpublicly denied the existence of Quetta Shura and thepresence of Haqqani Network in Pakistan

, it picked upkey leaders and incarcerated more than half of the top Af-ghan Taliban leadership to stall a direct channel betweenKarzai and the Taliban without ISI sanction

as well as toshow its leverage before entering into a strategic dialoguewith America in March 2010. Pakistan finally opened upregarding its own interests in the Pak-US Strategic Dialog.America acknowledged the importance of Pakistan’s rolein peace talks between Kabul and the Taliban but rebuffeda civil nuclear deal similar to India’s while asking thearmy to abandon its 30-year reliance on Islamist militantsfor foreign policy objectives

. Additionally, Pakistan andAmerica were still at odds with specific aspects of theirAfghan strategy, as America wanted to weaken or dividethe Taliban

through the surge, extension of drone strikesin Baluchistan and military operation in North Waziristan,to negotiate with the Taliban from a position of strength.While Pakistan agreed in principle with the need for aNorth Waziristan operation, it excused itself citing over-extension. In actuality Pakistan’s leverage in Afghanistandepended on the strength of the Taliban with sanctuar-ies and nerve centers both in the Quetta-Chaman borderregion and North Waziristan. Additionally, the army lead-ership was unsure of the backlash of such an operationunderstanding full well that it would exceed all previousoperations given NW was now a sanctuary of all kinds of militants groups (Haqqani, Hezb-i-Islami, Al-Qaeda, TTPand the Punjabi Taliban).As Pakistan delayed the North Waziristan operation, theAmericans doubled drone attacks to 90-124

in 2010. Butthe Pak-US perspective differed drastically as independentPakistani media reports put casualty figures in terms of terrorist to civilian ratio at 41:59

, while an American journal assessing all drone attacks till June 2010 put theterrorist: civilians: unknown ratio at 80:4.5:15

. This pro-vides an apt indication of why America could not relate tothe increasing anti-Americanism in the country. Althoughthere had been an American presence in Pakistan since2001, the terms of engagement had been settled with thePakistan Army. But since the return to civilian rule andwith it’s acquiesce

, American had increased its footprintthrough a $1bn embassy and personnel expansion from300 to 1,000 including both civilians (for Kerry Lugar Bill’scivilian support) and also covert operatives outside the ISIdomain

. As American pressure and operation increased

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leading to the killing of two Pakistani soldiers in KurramAgency crossing the red line of cross border operations,Pakistan closed the Afghan border crossing constitut-ing 80% of NATO’s non-lethal supply line for 10 days

while more than a 100 trucks were burnt by Taliban insidePakistan, further indicating Pakistan’s leverage over NATOforces just a few weeks before the Pak-American StrategicDialogue in October. With its enhanced leverage intact,Pakistan Army, the real power in the country took steps tolimit American covert operations in the country, primarilythose being conducted unilaterally.Thus this period saw America falling back to the originalPakistani position of negotiating with the Taliban forpeace in Afghanistan. Additionally, Pakistan Army practi-cally showed its strength and leverage in all spheres of theAfghan imbroglio: taking on militant groups within thecountry, incarcerating Afghan Taliban leadership, strangu-lating the NATO supply line, and lastly arresting America’sindependent intelligence operations within Pakistan.Although Pakistan had now acted in all tribal agencies of FATA except NW, it clearly discriminated between militantgroups targeting the Pakistani state and those targetingAfghanistan. Thus suggesting that Pakistan’s StrategicDepth policy, which seemed to be in disarray following9/11, was back on track and Pakistan was well positionedto negotiate its interests in Afghanistan and the region.Rethinking Pakistan’s Strategic InterestsAfghanistan, a land locked gateway between South,Central and West Asia has been a confluence of compet-ing interests of regional states (Central Asian States,Iran, India, China and Pakistan) and international powers(US, Russia). Pakistan’s initial interests in Afghanistanhad been based on the territorial security of its unrec-ognized western border inhabited by 19 tribes

livingon both sides of the Durand Line. While America left theregion following Soviet withdrawal, its sponsored Jihad,the ideological warfare that it had helped groom withSaudi Wahabi ideology and ISI’s logistical expertise wascontinued by Pakistan for its own strategic interests in theregion. Although Pakistan had gradually left the secularideals of its founder increasingly using Islam for bringingtogether a multinational state before the 1980s Afghanwar, the sponsorship of Deobandi-Wahabi ideology mixedwith militancy training and funding facilitation by theState had created a huge Jihad industry. This industry al-lowed Pakistan to gain Strategic Depth in Afghanistan andto keep India bogged down in the Kashmir border conflictthroughout the 1990s but with tremendous internal costs.As 9/11 brought the West back to Afghanistan primar-ily to undo the same ideological militant infrastructureit had helped germinate, it left Pakistan’s regional policyexecuted through ideological non-state actors in tat-ters while also threatening Pakistan’s territorial security.Musharraf allayed the territorial threat by joining theAmerican “War on Terror” but America’s expedient policyframework which excluded the Taliban from the Bonnprocess, which Lakhtar Brahimi aptly phrased “the originalsin”,

100

led to a hostile Kabul dispensation. Further, sensingAmerica’s lack of long term interest in Afghanistan by notputting needed boots on the ground and more importantlyby shifting strategic priority to Iraq left Pakistan Armywith no choice but to preserve its blood line in Afghani-stan, especially when its arch enemy India was closingits grip by opening consulates near the Pakistan borderand making investments which could bypass Pakistan’sstrategic location as the transit trade route for energyrich Central Asia. As Pakistan’s competition for influencein the region vastly outweighed the country’s interests inthe “War on Terror”,

101

its perceived policy ambivalencetowards militants was in actuality a conscious decisionas Pakistan Army never considered Al-Qaeda, the AfghanTaliban or the Punjabi Taliban a threat to the State. But aforced closing of Kashmir Jihad at the threat of war withIndia and the incursions in FATA to net Al-Qaeda primar-ily to show its support for the “War on Terror” to America,redirected some militant factions to instead focus on thePakistani State and security apparatus. Pakistan’s elite

America acknowledged theimportance of Pakistan’s rolein peace talks between Kabuland the Taliban but rebuffeda civil nuclear deal similar toIndia’s while asking the armyto abandon its 30-year relianceon Islamist militants for foreignpolicy objectives.

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deeply linked in an Afghan civil war (along with other re-gional players) while being diplomatically isolated for sup-porting the Taliban? The Pakistan Army Chief Kiyani whilesubscribing to Strategic Depth defined it as “a border wedon’t need to worry about” indicating his interest in apeaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan rather than itsdescent into obscurantism

105

. He has stated that a gradualtransition within the military establishment is under waywhile hinting a policy change towards non-state actors,saying that national defense will not be outsourced

106

. ButPakistan still perceives Afghanistan as a battleground forinfluence with India as Kiyani told Obama in their meetingthat US was not addressing his strategic imperatives (vis-

perceived that targeting of the Pakistani state had beenbecause of its alliance with US rather than the militantswanting State power

102

. Thus Pakistan’s implicit policy hassince been to convince all militant groups to concentratetheir energies in Afghanistan while tackling anti-stategroups who fail to understand Pakistan’s compulsion vis-à-vis America

103

. Taliban still fit Pakistan’s interest wellwithin the Strategic Depth framework, allowing Pakistan’sinfluence in Kabul following NATO withdrawal, checkPushtun nationalism, provide access to Central Asia andfacilities for Kashmir bound militants

104

.But does Pakistan want to have the same scenario in Af-ghanistan as the 1990s when its intelligence agency was(Rs in Billion)2007-8 2009-10 % increaseDirect Cost of War on Terror149320115(Potential) cost compensation to victims36100Cost of damage to property and infrastructureb81363Higher cost of defence 109247127Higher cost of police 2143105Higher cost of private security81138Indirect Cost of War on Terror231521126Costs to local economies42130210Loss of economic growth in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa40130225Cost of IDPs2n.an.aCosts of higher risk perceptions 189391107Fall in private investment 52244369Fall in stock market capitalizationa 1201232Others174441Total Cost of War (Pak Rs.)380841Total Cost of War (US$ billion)610US Bilateral Assistance (US$ billion)23.6Pakistan's Burden of War (US$ billion)46.4Table3: Pakistan’s Burden of War

Source: Social Impact of the Security Crises, Social Development in Pakistan Annual Review 2009-10Karachi: Social Policy & Development Centre (SPDC) 2010

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Af-Pak framework. This includes both a stable Afghani-stan devoid of terrorist bases and civil war, as well as astable Pakistan, which does not support militant groups

115

.America’s concern regarding Pakistan, with some termingit the biggest foreign policy challenge of the 21st centuryis because of Pakistan’s mix of the fastest growing nucleararsenal in the world and being home to a large numberof terrorist organizations

116

. This concern is now sharedby other European capitals and the change of focus canbe termed from the fact that Lashkar-e-Taiba is nowmentioned alongside Al-Qaeda in most policy reviews.Mindful of its current weak position vis-à-vis Pakistan,which enjoys unusually strong leverage with both sides of the Afghan war, and could jeopardize the American warthrough reduction of intelligence cooperation and closingof NATO’s logistical route

117

, America pursues a carrotheavy strategic dialogue to encourage Pakistan towardsits own policy interests while strategizing to decrease itsreliance on Pakistan

118

. America had lost leverage in theregion because of the earlier deterioration of Pak-India,US-Iran, US-China and Russia-NATO relations

119

andthus roping in China and others to pressure Pakistan orto defuse regional tension through Pakistan India peacehave not yet borne fruit. But on the contrary, Americanpolicy analysts have also put the option of cut & runin Afghanistan, putting Pakistan on the list of statessponsoring terrorism

120

and forming a strategic alliancewith India to contain a dangerous Pakistan

121

on the table.Additionally, America is aware of its long-term leverageover Pakistan as 1/4 of Pakistan exports are US bound, 1/3foreign investment comes from US, and additionally it hasthe power to use IFI’s to isolate Pakistan or curtail militaryassistance stalling Pak-Army’s American made weaponryfor lack of spare parts

122

.Thus both assumptions underlying the current policyframework are weak, but even if they are granted, whatcan not be looked over is the internal cost of the Strate-gic Depth policy framework which discriminates betweengood versus bad ideological militants and uses non-stateactors as a key tool for foreign policy objectives. Terror-ism cant not be countered when suicide bomber trainingcamp in Shawal, SW is run jointly by Sirajuddin Haqqani, astrategic asset for Pakistan Army focusing on Afghanistanand Qari Hussain

123

, a hunted TTP militant commanderresponsible for most suicide attacks within Pakistan. Suchà-vis India)

107

. This India centric security thinking whichdictates Pakistan’s Afghan policy, leading to the supportof the Taliban in Afghanistan and reluctance of the armyto become a counter insurgency force,

108

thus followingcontainment rather than eradication of militants at home(military refuses to act against Lashkar-e-Taiba till Kash-mir and other issues with India are resolved

109

) is based ona number of assumptions. First, the reconcilable ideologi-cal militant groups can be separated from the irreconcil-able, who can then be tackled independently without af-fecting the relationship with the others. Second, Pakistanalone has the strength to compete with the interests of the sole superpower, NATO and regional players who allnow see ideological non-state actors as a threat to theirsecurity in a post 9/11 security environment.Experts agree that multiple groups constitute the insur-gency in Afghanistan and FATA but only Shahzad acceptsthat a gulf is possible between the Taliban and Al-Qa-eda

110

. The Qandahari group is less inclined towards Al-Qaeda

111

and its foot soldiers are less ideologically inclinedthan the Pakistan based groups. Others argue that MullahOmar, although key to reconciliation has little power onthe ground which rests with the neo-Taliban (the newgeneration Sirajuddin Haqqani versus Jalaluddin Haqqani)who predominantly subscribe to the pan-Islamic Al-Qaedaideology

112

; the Haqqani group especially has close tieswith both Al-Qaeda and TTP (Baitullah Mehsud got threemembers of the Haqqani family released in a prisonerswap with Pakistan Army

113

). Thus most experts dismissPakistan’s strategic thinking that homegrown militantscan be crushed while maintaining Afghan Taliban proxyfor final settlement.

114

America’s war in Afghanistan initially focused on theelimination of Al-Qaeda but has since evolved into an

It is also perfectly understand-able for a military institutionto be strategically trainedin a zero sum game with itsarch enemy, but for that to beunchallenged State policy fordecades is anathema to growthand progress of any nation.

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Number 11 - 13 | April 2011

paradoxical security framework is a step up from the1990s instead making Pakistan the Strategic Depth forAfghan and international Islamist militants, and leading toState’s loss of sovereignty over vast areas. It has alloweddomestic terrorism for strategic needs in Afghanistan tothe effect that militant’s practically gained control overpeople’s lives in FATA and Swat by eliminating traditionalleadership. But more importantly, it is this subservienceof domestic security to the Strategic Depth frameworkthat has led to immeasurable costs in the socio-culturaldomain. The continuing need of Deobandi-Wahabi schoolsfor Jihad has led to increased religious extremism, mili-tarization and criminality in society as other sects havefollowed suit in safeguarding their own communities.Sectarianism and violence earlier restricted to Sunni-Shiahas taken on a new dimension as other than the Ahmediand Shia, now the Barelvi sect (Sufi saint mausoleums andEid Milad-un-Nabi) is also being targeted while religiousscholars (the ulema), who have passed injunctions againstsuicide bombings have been killed irrespective of theirschools of thought

124

. Since 2001, a total of 2,564 citizenshave been killed while 5,071

125

have been injured in sec-tarian violence, triple the casualty figure of 1989-2000

126

.Thus a change in Strategic Depth policy is necessary forPakistan’s internal stability. While Pakistan Army as aninstitution is skilled in the realism of international rela-tions, as it forgoes its ideological partner when faced witha territorial threat; It closes down and reforms sections of the ISI when faced with internal threat and insubordina-tion; still it fails to understand that its strategic policyframework is flawed and hurting the country. An impor-tant factor in this regard is the civil military power imbal-ance and a lack of trust between the two institutions. Thearmy has managed the Afghan and Kashmir policy sinceZia’s time leading to a lack of rethinking and reassess-ment for the last 30 years as policy change is primarily anoutcome of pluralism, opposition and peaceful transferof power, the beauty of democracy. It is also perfectlyunderstandable for a military institution to be strategi-cally trained in a zero sum game with its arch enemy, butfor that to be unchallenged State policy for decades isanathema to growth and progress of any nation. This canbe judged from the fact that all democratically electedleaders since the last 30 years have either extended oraccepted peace overtures towards India and Zardari’sforeign policy agenda also includes peace with India, noTaliban safe havens in Pakistan and good relations withAmerica

127

. But the civil political leadership has yet to gainthe confidence of the powerful security establishment andlacks the institutional strength to forcefully make a casefor policy change

128

, thus the strategic policy role stayswith the military

129

.As the end game in Afghanistan nears, Pakistan wouldbe well advised to understand that the root of its cur-rent predicament lies in its undefined borders in the Westand East and thus its leverage should be used towardsthese ends. Although Pakistan is in a strong position togain strategic space in Afghanistan, the Pakistan militaryshould understand that this leverage is an outcome of excessive internal costs and its unaccountability. Pakistanshould not confuse this short-term leverage with long-term influence, which is dependent on internal strengthand strong diplomatic relations based on mutual interests.For this, Pakistan would need to bury the Strategic Depthpolicy framework to explore and exercise the following setof policy options: First, make a clean break from using ide-ological non-state actors for its policy objectives. Second,enhance its diplomatic relations (US, Saudi, and China),which were built on the foundations of security arrange-ments with security agenda usually trumping economicinterests,

130

to encompass a broad development focus.Third, Pakistan desperately needs to put its internal housein order and to that end seeking peace with India, whichis involved in proxy wars with Pakistan and can exploitits internal troubles

131

, would be a desirable goal. Finally,Pakistan needs to evolve a comprehensive counter terror-ism and extremism strategy, foremost being integrationof FATA with the rest of the country and strengthening

As Pakistan’s competition forinfluence in the region vastlyoutweighed the country’s inter-ests in the “War on Terror”, itsperceived policy ambivalencetowards militants was in ac-tuality a conscious decision asPakistan Army never consideredAl-Qaeda, the Afghan Talibanor the Punjabi Taliban a threatto the State.

”“

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not serve its national interest.

136

On the other hand America has yet to devise a regionalsolution to allay Pakistan’s security concerns

137

vis-à-visIndia. It is pushing ahead with combat troop withdrawaldate to 2014

138

buying itself more time. Pakistan stillhas time and opportunity to re-strategize and devise aninnovative policy towards Afghanistan combing regionaland bilateral approach, whereby Afghanistan and India areseen as part of the solution to dismantle and disrupt ter-rorism in the region and have stake in peace and sustain-able development of the region. Such a vision demandsbroad internal consensus, which implies that the civiliangovernment and the Pakistan Army must act in unison andconcert, supplementing and supporting each other andpursing shared goals.its public institutions to create the 2 million yearly jobs

132

required for its current demographics. This demands aparadigm shift, which is not possible with a war in its ownneighborhood that has caused 9,410 civilian and 3,325security agencies fatalities

133

while displacing more than 3million people from their homes (although most have goneback). Pakistan continues and could leverage in Afghani-stan in strategic terms, however, time is running out andit has already lost the 1st decade of the 21st century with$43bn

134

(Also see Table 3) as the cumulative cost of warto the economy and additionally reduced public servicesspending (due to higher spending on security) leading toPakistan most likely missing its Millennium DevelopmentGoals 2015 targets

135

. Thus there is a growing realizationin Pakistan that a continuation of war in Afghanistan does

1. The Durand Line was agreed upon as the border between Afghanistan and British India in 1893 to be in effect for a 100 years till 1993.2. Haq, Sadr Pakistan General Zia ul. Speeches Vol. 1 5 July – 31 Dec 1977. In the founding address to Council of Islamic Ideology on Sept 29, 1979 he isquoted “We wantto make Pakistan as experiment in Islam”. On July 5, 1977 quoted “Pakistan came into being and will stay for Islam. Islamic System is necessary”.3. Muneer, Mohammad Justice. From Jinnah to Zia, Lahore: Vanguard Books 1979.4. Nawaz, Shuja. Crossed Swords, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008 p. 384.5. Haq, Sadr Pakistan General Zia ul. Speeches Vol. 1 5 July – 31 Dec 1977. Zia’s addressed the Pakistan Army as “Soldiers of Islam” in Address to the Nation27th July 1977.Jalal, Ayesha. The State of Martial Rule, Lahore: Vanguard Books 1991. For Zia, Pakistan & Islam were two sides of the same coin. Protection & integrity of both was the task of military establishment alone.6. Nawaz, Shuja. Crossed Swords, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 373.7. ibid, p. 375.8. Riedel, Bruce. Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the future of global Jihad, The Brookings Institution, July 18, 2011. Last Accessed on March 11,2011.9. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007.10. The Tableeghi Jamaat and Jamiat –Ulema-Islam (JUI) are Deobandi groups while the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) though eschewing sectarian is much closer toDeobandi, Wahabi groups in ideology than the Barelvi or Shia. Among the Islamists, JUI & JI have primarily influenced State policy as elected governmentor through the support of dictators.11. Nawaz, Shuja. Crossed Swords, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 377.12. Hasan, Mubashir. ‘The Military loses and gains clout’, The Express Tribune, October 26, 2010. Military allowed Benazir slot of Prime Minister on 3 condi-tions: 1. Military to remain independent in its own affairs; 2. No jurisdiction over nuclear program; 3. Ghulam Ishaq Khan to serve as President, Lt. GenRetd. Yaqub Khan as foreign minister and VA Jaffery as head of the finance ministry.13. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 166.14. Rana, Amir. Jihad-e-Afghanistan or Kashmir, (Urdu), Lahore: Mashal Publications 2002, p. 20.15 Jones, Seth G. & Fair, C. Christine. Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2010.16. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 27. General Nasir was sacked in May 1993 and some 1100ISI operative were retired or sent back to their army units.17. Jones, Seth G. & Fair, C. Christine. Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2010. Pakistan supported with logistics and suppliesthrough ISI offices in Herat, Qandahar and Jalalabad.18. Khattak, I. Taliban Claim Mohmand Agency. The Friday Times, 11th February, 2001.19. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 267.20. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 27. The governments of Egypt, Jordan and Libya hadspecifically complained about the Peshawar base for terrorism planning in their country.21. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 38.22. Although two purges of the Shia in Parachinar and Gilgit had already taken place in 1988.23. Jamal, Arif. ‘Sufi Militants Struggle with Deobandi Jihadists in Pakistan’, The Jamestown Foundation: Terrorism Monitor, Volume 9 Issue 8. www.james-town.org. Last Accessed on March 11, 2011.24. Haq, Zia ul. Speech to the Majlis Shura , 1983. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iPkIqd4nNIM. Last accessed Feb. 28, 2011.25. Hussain, Mujahid. Punjab Taliban, Lahore: Nigareshaat Publications 2009, p. 138.26. Rana, Amir & Gunaratna, Rohan. Al-Qaeda Fights Back Inside Pakistani Tribal Areas, Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies 2008, p. 86.27. ‘Sectarian Violence in Pakistan’, South Asia Terrorism Portal. New Delhi: The Institute for Conflict Management. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm. Last accessed March 15, 2011.The sectarian killings were initially restricted to leaders and activists, then state symbols eventually becoming indiscriminate by 1997 according to Zahab,Mariam. ‘The regional dimension of sectarian conflict in Pakistan’, CERI Paris. Last Accessed March 11, 2011.The sectarian penetration of body politics could be assessed by the promulgation of two ministers of Sipah-e-Sahaba (the parent party of anti-Shia terroristoutfit Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and also categorized as the ‘mother’of all Deobandi Jihadi organizations) in the 1995 Punjab Government in Ahmed, Khaled.Religious Developments in Pakistan 1999-2008. Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2010

End Notes

Number 11 - 13 | April 2011

28. Hussain, Mujahid. Punjab Taliban, Lahore: Nigareshaat Publications 2009, p. 24.29. Rana, Amir.”Jihadi Print Media in Pakistan: An Overview”, Conflict and Peace Studies, Issue 1 Number 1, Islamabad: PIPS 2008. p. 47.30. Hussain, Mujahid. Punjab Taliban, Lahore: Nigareshaat Publications 2009, p. 138. The ISI facilitated Lashkar-e-Taiba’s fund raising drive by asking tradersto contribute. Additionally LeT’s donation boxes across the country generated Rs. 120 million daily.31. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 4132. Jones, Seth G. & Fair, C. Christine. Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2010, p. 41. Pakistan provided three bases Jacobabad,Dalbandin and Shamsi.33. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007. Economic Aid included $1 bn loan writeoff, $600 millionbudgetary support, $12.5bn debt rescheduling.34. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 45.35. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. ‘Pakistan has its own battle to fight’. The Asia Times June 28, 2010. http://www.atimes.com. Last Accessed on March 15, 201136. ibid37. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 14838. ibid p. 9139. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 120.40. ibid, p. 10741. A Pakistan-India war at this time would have achieved Al-Qaeda’s civilizational war paradigm through an America-India-Israel (the ‘Christian-Hindu-Jew’)alliance versus a nuclear armed Muslim state. Still, that this later came to dominate the conspiracy theory whirlwind behind terrorist attacks in Pakistanattests either to the dominance of Islamism in the Pakistani public discourse or to the sponsorship of this discourse by the dominant military establishment.42. Pakistan Policy Working Group. The Next Chapter: The United States and Pakistan, September 2008, New York: Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistan-policy-working-group-next-chapter-united-states-pakistan/p17413. Last Accessed on March 11, 2011.43. Yousafzai, Rahimullah, ‘A New Proxy War?’, Newsline 19 June 2006.44. Though Jaish-e-Muhammad initially took credit for it, some authors state that it was instead a Lashkar-e-Taiba operation. These and two sectarian groupsSipah-e-Sahaba and Tekrik-e-Jafaria were banned.45. Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, London: Penguin Books 2010, p. 165.46. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 147.47. Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, London: Penguin Books 2010, p. 159.48. Zahid Hussain. General Sympathy Aiding the Taliban, Newsline, 18 Nov, 2009.49. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. ‘Al-Qaeda’s guerrilla chief lays out strategy’. The Asia Times Oct 15, 2009. http://www.atimes.com. Last Accessed on March 15,2011.50. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 173, while Ahmed Rashid calls it a ISI sponsored alliance.51. ibid, p. 175. While these parties publicly criticized Musharraf’s policies and enflamed the public with Anti-American rhetoric, still they were aligned withmilitary’s objectives as indicated by the three hour meeting between Musharraf and head of Jamaat-e-Islami on the eve of 2002 elections.52. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 24953. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 24054. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. ‘Pakistan has its own battle to fight’. The Asia Times June 28, 2010. http://www.atimes.com. Last Accessed on March 15, 2011.Jaish Al-Muslim was publicly and officially launched on Sept 17, 2003 in Peshawar.55. Rana, Amir & Gunaratna, Rohan. Al-Qaeda Fights Back Inside Pakistani Tribal Areas, Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies 2008, p. 71.56. Jones, Seth G. & Fair, C. Christine. Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2010 p. 76. A Lt. Gen went to the militants’ locationand exchanged gifts. He thus accepted the madrassa and associated clergy as the new power in the area while subscribing legitimacy to the militants asnegotiating partner rather than tribal chiefs.57. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. ‘Another deadly blow for Pakistan’. The Asia Times Oct 31, 2006. http://www.atimes.com. Last Accessed on March 15, 2011. WhileNek Mohammad was killed by a Drone strike in South Waziristan, the Pakistan Army took credit for the killing. Similarly Baitullah Mehsud was targetedby Drone few days after an agreement with Pak Army. Additionally the Oct 2006 American helicopter gunship strike in Damadola, Bajaur came two daysbefore Pakistan Army and militants were to sign a peace deal.58. Rana, Amir & Sial, Safdar & Basit, Abdul. Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies 2010. Fact Files 2 & 3.Major military operations which began in South Waziristan (2004), extended to North Waziristan (2005), Swat (2007), Bajaur (2008) and Khyber (2009). Inall but Khyber, military action was followed by a peace agreement with the militants.59. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. ‘Hostage deaths adds to Musharraf’s woes’. The Asia Times October 16, 2004. http://www.atimes.com. Last Accessed on March 15,2011. Argues that September 2004 bombing by Pakistani planes leading to civilian deaths among the Mehsuds led the Mehsud youth to join the insurgency which was earlier limited to few Waziri sub-tribes. Even Baitullah Mehsud had earlier disagreed with Abdullah Mehsub in targeting Pakistani forces only tochange his opinion later.60. Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, London: Penguin Books 2010.61. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. ‘Revolution in Pakistan Mountains’. The Asia Times March 23, 2006. http://www.atimes.com. Last Accessed on March 15, 2011.62. Pakistan government took responsibility of American attacks on Nek Mohammad and the attacks in Bajaur Agency in 2006.63. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. ‘Warizistan Jihadi wage war on each other’. The Asia Times March 13, 2007. http://www.atimes.com. Last Accessed on March 20,2011.64. Yousafzai, Aqeel. Talibalization, Lahore: Nigarishat Publications 2009, p. 205. Fazlullah’s brother died in the strike leading him to take a militant route.65. GlobalSecurity.org, “Tehrik-Taliban Pakistan”, Alexandria: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ttp.htm Last accessed on April 4, 2011.66. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. ‘Pakistan makes a deal with the Taliban’. The Asia Times March 1, 2007. http://www.atimes.com. Last Accessed on March 15, 2011.67. Rana, Amir & Sial, Safdar & Basit. Abdul, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies 2010, p. 155.68. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008.69. Ibid, p. 385.70. Yousafzai, Aqeel. Talibalization, Lahore: Nigarishat Publications 2009. When trucks full of arms from Dir to Imam Deri, Swat was intercepted by the police,both SHO and DCO were transferred in 2007. Earlier in a case of Bank Robbery in 2004, when police captured the robbers, three Al-Qaeda men were flownout by helicopters while the investigation officer linking it to Peochar Camp was transferred at the behest of Intelligence Agencies.71. ibid, p. 215.72. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 389.73. Karzai’s (much criticized for being anti-Pakistan in the media) attended the inauguration of President Zardari signaling government’s intention of goodrelations with Afghanistan while PPP-ANP-MQM have long been considered Indophile (India loving) parties by the military establishment.74. Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, London: Penguin Books 2010, p. 163. The Indian Embassy bombing in Kabul on July 7, 2008 had been traced back to Pakistani intelligence while both Karzai and embassy bombings were carried out the Haqqani group.75. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 53.76. Rashid, Ahmed. ‘The Afghanistan Impasse’ The New York Review of Books August 10, 2009. www.ahmedrashid.com. Last Accessed on March 01,2011.77. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 366.78. Hussain, Zahid. From Suicide to Safety, Newsline Aug 8, 2009.79. Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, London: Penguin Books 2010, p. 161.

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phymath999

Friday, December 13, 2013

“Strategic Depth”: Does It Promote Pakistan’s Strategic Interests?

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